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This essay exists as a segment in a line of study and writing practice that moves 
between a critical theory analysis of translation studies conceptions of language, and the 
practical questions of what those ideas might mean for contemporary translation and 
writing practice. Although the underlying preoccupation of this essay, and my more 
general line of inquiry is translation studies and practice, in many ways translation is 
merely a way into a discussion on language. For this essay, translation is the threshold 
of language. But the two trails of the discussion never manage to elude each other, and 
these concatenations have informed two experimental translation methods, referred to 
here as Live Translations and Series Translations. Following the essay are a number of 
poems in translation, all of which come from Blanco Nuclear (1985) by the 
contemporary Spanish poet, Esteban Pujals Gesalí.1 The first group, the Live 
Translations consist of transcriptions I made from audio recordings read in a public 
setting, in which the texts were translated in situ, either off the page of original Spanish-
language poems, or through a process very much like that carried out by simultaneous 
translators, for which readings of the poems were played back to me through 
headphones at varying speeds to be translated before the audience. The translations 
collected are imperfect renderings, attesting to a moment in language practice rather 
than language objects. The second method involves an iterative translation process, by 
which three versions of any one poem are rendered, with varying levels of fluency, 
                                                
1 Esteban Pujals Gesalí (born Madrid in 1952) teaches English and North American literature at the 
Autonomous University of Madrid. He has translated, among many others, T.S. Eliot, Cuatro Cuartetos 
(1990) and John Ashbery, Galeones de abril (1994), is the editor of an anthology of contemporary US 
poetry, La lengua radical (1992), and has published numerous critical studies in Spanish of US poets and 
writers. His poetry includes Blanco Nuclear (1985) and Juegos de artificio (1986). 
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fidelity and servility. All three translations are presented one after the other as a series, 
with no version asserting itself as the primary translation. These examples, as well as 
the translation methods themselves, are intended as preliminary experiments within an 
endlessly divergent continuum of potential methods and translations, and not as a 
complete representation of a methodology. 
 
Is Translation Possible? 
 
‘That utterances are translated from one language to another is a fact we meet with everywhere, 
in the most diverse forms.’ Friedrich Schleiermacher (2004: 43). 
 
‘Poetry,’ Roman Jakobson asserted in 1959, reigned over as it is by paronomasia, ‘by 
definition is untranslatable. Only creative transposition is possible’ (2000: 118). We 
meet with the fact of translation everywhere, yet it is in some way impossible. The 
situation seems to vibrate. It is lifted up and suppressed at the same moment, relifted, 
relieved and struck down again. In both directions the thing moves out of sight. One 
way out of the aporia of translation’s impossibility is mapped by Derrida in ‘What Is a 
‘Relevant’ Translation?’ in which he states ‘I don’t believe that anything can ever be 
untranslatable—or, moreover, translatable’ (2001: 178). This axiom avoids the charge 
of unintelligibility or contradiction by positing a certain economy that relates the 
translatable to the untranslatable, not as the same to the other, but as same to same or 
other to other. This economy folds out in two directions. The first, property, from the 
etymological root of the term economy: oikonomia, the law—nomos—of the oikos, of 
what is proper, appropriate to itself, at home (178). The other, quantity, provides a 
referent, qualifies, since economy requires calculable quantities. A relevant translation 
then, is a translation ‘whose economy, in these two senses, is the best possible, the most 
appropriating and the most appropriate possible’ (178-179). The functioning of this 
economy—the economy which holds the translatable and untranslatable beside each 
other as same to same, other to other—is illustrated by way of two hyperbole. First, a 
fully competent translator, fluent in two languages, cultures and cultural memories, 
given time, should find no untranslatable, no remainder, in a work. What lacks a simple 
referent can be explained through analogy, what lacks analogy can be taught. Second, a 
competent reader, given a book full of translator’s notes, should receive on all levels, 
what is called the original.  
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However, this operation does not take the name of translation according to Derrida’s 
economy. The books don’t balance. For ‘the translation must be quantitatively 
equivalent to the original’ (2001: 179). This quantity, he claims, must be measured by 
the number of words: ‘The philosophy of translation, the ethics of translation—if 
translation does in fact have these things—today aspires to be a philosophy of the word, 
a linguistics or ethics of the word. At the beginning of translation is the word’ (180). 
And though most translation is more interested in the sense than the verbal, ‘relevance’ 
is still tied up with an ideal, not of word-for-word, but ‘as close as possible to the 
equivalence of ‘one word by one word,’’ thereby respecting verbal quantity as a 
quantity of words, ‘each of which is an irreducible body, the indivisible unity of a 
meaning or concept’ (Derrida 2001: 181). However words are at once stubbornly 
singular and irretrievably plural. The concept of différance critiques this conception of 
the word. For Derrida, meaning is an ‘effect of relations and differences along a 
potentially endless chain of signifiers—polysemous, intertextual, subject to infinite 
linkages’ (cited in Venuti 2003: 238). As such meaning is always ‘differential and 
deferred, never present as an original unity… a site of proliferating possibilities that can 
be activated in diverse ways by the receivers of an utterance,’ which thus ‘exceed the 
control of individual users’ (Venuti 2003: 238).  
 
This intractable valency of words asserts itself wherever there is a homophonic or 
homonymic effect. It is at this moment that translation acknowledges its impossibility. 
For a homonym or homophone defies word-to-word translation2. It necessitates either 
the resignation to the loss of effect, economy, strategy—and ‘this loss can be 
enormous’—or the addition of some kind of gloss, a translator’s note, which ‘even in 
the best of cases … confesses the impotence or failure of the translation’ (Derrida 2001: 
181).3 While the translator’s note achieves an explanation of the meaning and effects in 
the original, it breaks with ‘the economic law of the word, which defines the essence of 
translation in the strict sense’ (181). Nothing is untranslatable. Nothing is translatable. 
 
The last way out of this impossible task of translation is through an interrogation of the 
relation of impossibility to possibility, an interrogation that Derrida initiates through a 
                                                
2 Once again the case of poetry makes its way to the front, declaring itself to be preeminently difficult, in 
that: ‘in poetry … phonemic similarity is sensed as semantic relationship’ (Jakobson 2000: 118).  
3 Of course, this recognition of impotence or failure could also be applied to any sort of textual addendum 
or marginalia, footnotes being a prime example or offender. 
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discussion of mercy and might, as it appears in The Merchant of Venice (1951) in which 
Portia describes mercy as ‘the mightiest in the mightiest’ (44.1.185). This might rises 
over might and ‘obliges us to ask ourselves if the experience of forgiveness is an 
experience of “power,” of the “power-to-forgive,”’ (Derrida 2001: 192), or one might 
say: the power to relinquish one’s power/obligation to punish. What is at play here is a 
hermeneutics of the superlative. ‘More as the most and as more than, of the mightiest as 
more mighty than—and as more than mighty.’ The superlative then becomes of ‘another 
order than might, power, or the possible: the impossible that is more than impossible 
and therefore possible’ (193). This idea perhaps finds its most enlightening example in 
the German prefix über. Derrida cites a phrase from Angelus Silesius: ‘das 
Überunmöglichste ist möglich’ (193). Which can be translated, depending on the 
rendering of über, as ‘the most impossible, the absolute impossible, the impossible par 
excellence is possible,’ or also, ‘the more than impossible, the beyond impossible is 
possible.’ Either way, they ‘wind up saying that the tip of the summit (the peak) belongs 
to a different order than that of the summit’ (193). 
 
The words here, in the race to the superlative, to superate one another, leap over each 
other without realising that they have left each other behind. The mightiest of might 
becomes more than might, and finds itself aligned with mercy. The most impossible, the 
more than impossible, finds itself back in the realm of possibility. This is the lot of 
translation. Never believing that it can bring the original across into the translating 
language, it nevertheless finds itself within this language, and it made the journey by 
way of the original text. By relieving it of its duty. Lifting it up and suppressing it 
simultaneously.  
 
The situation, the question of what is actually happening in translation, is illumined 
greatly by Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1968). This piece, 
written as an introduction to his own—critically unsuccessful—translation of Les Fleurs 
du Mal, occupies a central position in my reading of translation theory and practice. 
 
The task of the translator 
Benjamin’s essay sits within the greater volume of critical writing surrounding 
translation in a profoundly uneasy fashion. In one sense, he follows many of the tropes 
common to translation theory. He discusses sense and form, identity, fidelity and 
license. However, rather than directly arguing against the traditional ideals of 
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translation, his text argues across them. It moves along a different axis. Benjamin’s 
methodology is a kind of strange, intuitive science that picks apart the seemingly 
cohesive fabric of language to look at the constitution of the thread. If language is like 
cotton, he analyses the makeup of tropical flora; if it is like gossamer, he is talking 
about the sociology of spiders. 
 
The influence that Benjamin’s ideas would have on my thinking was not immediate 
upon first reading his essay. It seemed to have some relevant insights, and the citations 
from Rudolf Pannwitz seemed especially important. The notion that the translator must 
allow his own language ‘to be powerfully affected by the foreign tongue’ (cited in 
Benjamin 1968: 81), immediately resonated with my intuitive ideas about the purpose 
of translation. As a whole however, the article was one that I passed over quickly in 
search of more ideal material. My lack of receptiveness stemmed in part from a 
paralysing aversion to terms such as pure, true, absolute. The idea of a pure language—
when my interests lay in the hybrid, interwoven, interstitial qualities of languages—
seemed, if not objectionable, then at least unduly aggrandising. Derrida mentions 
something similar in relation to Heidegger’s terminology on language: ‘I do not much 
like the term “essence” of language. I would prefer to give a more living and dynamic 
meaning to this way of being, to this manifestation of linguistic spectrality, which is 
valid for all languages’ (2005: 105). 
 
In time I realised that Benjamin’s notion of pure language (reine Sprache) was an 
important idea. Not only did it contain a recognition of the ‘inner relation’ between 
languages, but also an understanding of some kind of movement in expression, of which 
the textual body of language scarcely bears a trace. As I read over the text again and 
again, as well as other writers’ readings of it, I began noting down all the important 
citations. I seemed to be rewriting the text almost line by line. Eventually, I began to 
develop the feeling that what I was doing was actually something like the character 
Pierre Menard from Borges’s ficto-philosophical essay, originally published in 1941, 
‘Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote’ (1965). I felt closer to this text than to much of my 
own writing, which seemed never to reach its mark. 
 
What I had initially perceived as a movement in language, which is generally left 
unrecognised by most translation/literary theory, was described in Benjamin’s 
description of that element in language that ‘cannot be communicated’ (1968: 79). This 
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element is either 
 
something that symbolizes or something symbolized. It is the former only in the finite products of 
language, the latter in the evolving of the languages themselves. And that which seeks to represent, 
to produce itself in the evolving of languages, is that very nucleus of pure language. Though 
concealed and fragmentary, it is an active force in life as the symbolized thing itself, whereas it 
inhabits linguistic creations only in symbolized form. While that ultimate essence, pure language, 
in the various tongues is tied only to linguistic elements and their changes, in linguistic creations it 
is weighted with a heavy, alien meaning. To relieve it of this, to turn the symbolizing into the 
symbolized, to regain pure language fully formed in the linguistic flux, is the tremendous and only 
capacity of translation. (80) 
 
This should not be taken to mean that works of translation are written in this pure 
language. Translations still take form within one or another of the fallen languages of 
man. It is only a ‘somewhat provisional way of coming to terms with the foreignness of 
languages’ (75), and it represents the inner relationship between languages by ‘realizing 
it in embryonic or intensive form’ (73). The relation of languages is based on the fact 
that they are not strangers, but are related in what they want to express (73). It is this 
intention in language that constitutes the relationship between languages, and also, 
which is the aim of translation: to reach for a mode of intention, which complements 
that of the original. In this way, the sense of the original is not something to be 
conveyed; in fact, translation must ‘in large measure refrain from wanting to 
communicate something, from rendering sense’ (79). 
 
The original is important to the translation only by relieving the translator ‘of the effort 
of assembling and expressing what is to be conveyed’ (79). The translation owes its 
existence to the original but does not serve it (72). Their kinship is not one of likeness 
(74), but rather involves the search for the ‘intended effect upon the language into 
which’ the work is being translated, so as to ‘produce in it an echo of the original’ (77). 
This echo, Christopher Fynsk explains, makes ‘the symbolizing dimension of the 
original reverberate in a kind of sympathetic vibration’ (1996: 185).  
 
The translation is not interested in any ‘core of meaning latent in the original’ (Fynsk 
1996: 185), since ‘meaning is never found in relative independence, as in individual 
words or sentences’ (Benjamin 1968: 75),4 rather it is interested with the original’s core 
meaning only insomuch as it ‘lends itself to complementation and ultimately a 
harmony’ (Fynsk 1996: 185). In an earlier essay on language, originally published in 
                                                
4 In Derrida’s terminology, it is always ‘differential or deferred,’ says Venutti (2003: 238). 
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1916, Benjamin argues that language communicates the ‘mental being’ of things only 
insofar as it is included in its linguistic being, ‘insofar as it is capable of being 
communicated’ (1996: 63). The translation only hopes to ‘touch the original lightly and 
only at the infinitely small point of the sense’ (Benjamin 1968: 81), as a tangent touches 
a curve. Sense is touched lightly, not conveyed. This sentiment is echoed by Derrida 
when he describes translation as coming to ‘lick’ the body of the ‘idiomatic singularity’ 
of the word as a flame or an amorous tongue might, ‘refusing at the last moment to 
consume or consummate’ (2001: 175). Weaving together Derrida and Benjamin, this 
flame leaves the body of the word intact—though not without eliciting the appearance 
of the other, drawing it out (Derrida 2001: 175)—and it is at this point, that translation 
‘catches fire on the eternal life of the works and the perpetual renewal of language’ 
(Benjamin 1968: 75). And it is at this moment that we arrive before the possibility of 
learning something of our relation with language. 
 
Translation as experimentum linguae 
In his preface to Infancy and History, Giorgio Agamben makes the claim that ‘one of 
the most urgent tasks for contemporary thought is, without a doubt, to redefine the 
concept of the transcendental in terms of its relation with language’ (1993: 4). 
Refiguring Kant’s concept of the transcendental, which omitted the question of 
language, Agamben proposes that the transcendental ‘must instead indicate an 
experience which is undergone only within language, an experimentum linguae in the 
true meaning of the words, in which what is experienced is language itself’ (4). To 
undergo an experience with something involves some kind of submission to it. ‘This 
something befalls us, strikes us, overwhelms and transforms us … the experience is not 
of our own making … we endure it, we suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to 
it’ (Heidegger 1971: 57). Language requires rendition. As well as being something to 
which we surrender, Heidegger states that an experience means ‘to attain something by 
going on a way’ (66). We must, therefore, make some sort of movement—a movement 
in language—in order to gain some knowledge of our relation to language. The task 
here is largely one of thinking. Not a putting of questions, but a listening for what is to 
be put in question (71).  
 
But language is too close to us. We find ourselves entangled and compromised by the 
web of language. However if we take notice of the ‘peculiar properties of thought,’ and 
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look about us in ‘the realm where thinking abides,’ we loosen ourselves from the web 
somewhat (75). When we speak, we tend to speak of things we already understand. But 
what concerns us regarding our relation with language is something that evades us. We 
want to give language the floor. What is called for is not more talk, since ‘discourse 
cannot speak its taking place’ (Agamben 1991: 62). In fact, it is possible that we are not 
able to say anything concrete about our relation to language. ‘There is some evidence,’ 
Heidegger states, that the essential nature of language flatly refuses to express itself in 
words’ (1971: 81). We may only be able to submit ourselves to an experience with it 
and carry on our way, somehow enriched by the experience. That silent experience is 
what we must carry over into our writing—and translation—practice. 
 
Just as the claim I mean what I say did not circumvent the problem of the referents of 
language and meaning in the earlier discussion, neither does our apparent and 
undeniable relation with language silence the question of an experience with language. 
To say I speak does not resolve Agamben’s ‘stubbornly pursued train of thought: what 
is the meaning of ‘I speak’?’ (1993: 5). Speech teaches us next to nothing about 
language since we are only able to simply ‘go ahead and speak a language’ precisely 
because language does not bring itself to language in this context but ‘holds back’ 
(Heidegger 1971: 59). Similarly, we understand and take for granted that we breathe air 
constantly, but this tells us little of air and still less of our experience of it. If we have to 
struggle for air however, we come closer to an understanding of our need for it. We may 
not understand the mechanics, but in moments of asphyxiation, we understand 
something about our relation with it. This also holds for language.  
 
Heidegger explains that language speaks itself as language ‘when we cannot find the 
right word for something that concerns us’ (1971: 59). It is then that we ‘leave unspoken 
what we have in mind and … language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us 
with its essential being’ (59). This makes sense within Benjamin’s framework also, if 
we imagine that in that moment of aphasia, language gives up on the business of 
signifying this or that object, and we find ourselves engaged in a moment of intention. 
Oddly, it is while we mean to say something, rather than when we have assigned a word 
to mean something, that we are most in contact with language as language. In 
Heidegger’s terminology, because we are being touched by the essence of language; in 
Benjamin’s because we have not yet translated pure language into fallen language. For 
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Agamben, the split that Benjamin finds in language is still relevant, however the 
division is not so much between pure language and languages, but rather is ‘ a fracture 
inherent in human language’ (Bartoloni 2004). In the work of Agamben, this moment of 
the self-presentation of language occurs in the notion of infancy5: ‘Infancy is an 
experimentum linguae of this kind, in which the limits of language are to be found not 
outside language, in the direction of its referent, but in an experience of language as 
such, in its pure self reference’ (Agamben 1993: 5). 
 
 The relation here to translation is evident. Translation, as a form, acknowledges its own 
aphasia: its impossible possibility, its ‘devotion to ruin,’ as Derrida (2001: 181) would 
have it. Having language as its only referent, it then sets about a movement toward other 
language, to other words. Time after time it comes upon a lack of words and 
paradoxically moves through pleonastic turns to overcome that loss. The translator, 
amongst two (in)complete systems of expression, is swamped by language yet 
continually at a loss for words. To return to the air metaphor, it is like breathing out of 
the window of a speeding car. The air rushes towards us yet we struggle to inhale. The 
translator has two languages on which to hold but is forever slipping between them.  
 
It is no coincidence that my interest in the strangeness and the limits of language first 
asserted itself while I was living abroad. For the first time in my life I had to defend 
myself in a language which was not my own. I quickly began to realise the peculiar 
enabling and limiting force of the English language with/in which I had grown up.6 To 
deform Wittgenstein’s maxim; until then, the limits of my world had been the limits of 
my language. In a new world a new set of limits set in relief the limits of my language, 
the limits of my world. The experience is described by Octavio Paz in which the 
immediate emotions one feels before an unknown language quickly transform 
themselves into doubts about our own language, as ‘El lenguaje pierde su universalidad 
y se revela como una pluralidad de lenguas’ (loses its universality and reveals itself as a 
plurality of languages)7 (1970: 9). 
 
                                                
5 Referring to the etymological root of the term meaning unable to speak, rather than the developmental 
stage. 
6 The English I have come to speak of course being merely a composite of a small sample of all the 
Englishes spoken in my immediate environs and throughout the world. Largely shaped by the locality and 
familial settings in which I was raised, it also works against much of that language, taking equal parts 
from pop-culture, high culture, academia, etc. 
7 My translation. 
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In another language, we are constantly ‘leaving unspoken what we have in mind’ 
(Heidegger 1971: 59). In our despair at the abandonment of language, we sense the 
magnitude—without implying in any way a perfect relational system—of language. 
Wittgenstein’s statement makes sense to us, that ‘the correct expression in language for 
the miracle of the existence of the world, albeit as expressing nothing within language, 
is the existence of language itself’ (cited in Agamben 1993: 9). Following through 
Wittgenstein’s line of thought, Agamben then asks what the most appropriate 
expression for the existence of language is. The only possible answer, Agamben 
concludes, is ‘human life, as ethos, as ethical way’ (9-10). Moving toward each other in 
language. This can double as a rationale for translation. Positioned between two 
languages, the translator refuses to settle in one or the other, but rather remains in the 
interstice, sounding out the space between the two, tuning the ear to two distinct and 
strange ways of movement and intention, hoping to realise a new way of approach and 
relation in the mother tongue.  
 
In order to position the translation methods that I have employed within the discussions 
initiated in this piece, I want to initiate a further discussion that simultaneously answers 
to two lines of questioning. I say answers to because the discussion doesn’t offer 
definitive resolutions to the questions, but rather responds to the call of the questions. 
Each question contains a guiding word that, rather than defining and circumscribing the 
discussion, persistently calls itself out in its full polysemy, returns to the text over and 
over, forging a presence that is more spectral than definitive. These two words are relief 
and failure, or relieving and failing. The two methods: the Series Translations and the 
Live Translations, though autonomous, are for me interrelated. So much so in fact, that I 
find myself unable to conduct two separate discussions; first of one, then of the other. 
Once again I find myself caught between two paths, two movements, two modes of 
intention, and the only way forward seems to be to somehow knit the two together.  
 
What, then, is a relieving translation? What, then, is a failing translation? 
 
… And then there are translations that hurl one language against another… taking the original text for a 
projectile and treating the translating language like a target. Their task is not to lead a meaning back to 
itself or anywhere else; but to use the translated language to derail the translating language. 
Michell Foucault (cited in Berman 2004: 277)  
 
Questions, especially as they are posited within a text, always involve a strange, false 
step in language and thought. They perform in a genuinely dramatic fashion, an almost 
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embarrassing theatre of ventriloquism. As in a performance which seeks audience 
participation through friends with rehearsed questions, it tacitly suggests the clichéd 
response: well I’m glad you asked that … The writer impersonates a presumed response 
is provoked in the reader, when in fact—a fact we all, with good grace, pretend not to 
know—the writer chooses to ask questions to which s/he wishes to respond. 
 
The questions that initiate this dual discussion, however, are doubly provocative. Both 
might seem non sequiturs. Then suggests a logical progression, but the discussion thus 
far has said nothing of relieving or failing translations. However, relief and failure are 
relevant to translation as I have framed it, and in employing the two terms, I have 
already begun to clear the way for a response.  
 
To begin with the second question, I would say that if I achieve anything with my Live 
Translations, it will be a failure. That is not to say that I regard achievement as failure, 
but rather that I am aiming to prepare the way for an experience with language. And if, 
as suggested earlier, we only come to know language through moments of failure, of 
abandonment, when ‘we leave unspoken what we have in mind’ (Heidegger 1971: 59), 
then a translation method that aims at some sort of experimentum linguae must engage 
with those moments which are ever-present in the taking place of translation. However, 
while traditional translation methods tend to cover those tracks, the Live Translation 
brings them out into the open for all to see and hear. So it is in that sense that I actively 
seek out failures, moments where the word breaks up, necessitating a ‘true step back on 
the way of thinking’ (Heidegger 1971: 108). 
 
In a sense, the first question is a translational adaptation of the question asked by 
Derrida in his ‘Qu’est-ce qu’une traduction “relevante”?’ (1999), to which I have 
referred earlier through the wonderfully abusive translation by Lawrence Venuti 
(Derrida 2001).8 The ‘translation’ I’m offering, relieving instead of relevant, for the 
(arguably) French term relevante, is a gesture made half in jest. Derrida employs the 
term not only because of the significance assigned to relevance in traditional translation 
theory, but also because of its English roots and ring.9 Indeed for Derrida, it is 
unknowable to which language the word relevante belongs (2001: 176). However while 
                                                
8 Venuti translates the title as ‘What is a “Relevant” Translation?’ 
9 Even this explanation oversimplifies the multitudinous investigation to which Derrida subjects the term 
relevante/relevant, an investigation that traverses English German and French, as well as the writings of 
Hegel, Shakespeare, and Derrida’s own oeuvre.  
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most translations tend to aim at relevance, mine aim at something else. The aim is not 
irrelevance, however the idea of relief, of some kind of relieving translation, seems to 
insist on its relevance.  
 
Firstly, it suggests itself by way of example. The translation of relevante by relieving 
could be considered an example of what Phillip Lewis calls abusive fidelity. Abusive 
fidelity in translation is a practice that ‘values experimentation, tampers with usage, 
seeks to match the polyvalencies and plurivocities or expressive stresses in the original 
by producing its own’ (1985: 270). These practices work against ‘weak’ or ‘servile’ 
translations. A critique of such practices is made in another of Derrida’s articles, from 
1971: ‘La mythologie blanche.’ In this article Derrida points to weak, servile 
translations as having a tendency to privilege the us system, that is, a chain of values 
linking the usual, the useful, and common linguistic usage. As Lewis explains: ‘to 
accredit the use-values is inevitably to opt for what domesticates or familiarizes a 
message at the expense of whatever might upset or force or abuse language or thought, 
might seek after the unthought or unthinkable in the unsaid or unsayable’ (1985: 270). 
 
This resonates strongly with the preoccupations of this essay, and after reading of 
adequate, natural, faithful renderings, I was relieved to read this in an academic text. 
However, it is possible that my translations go further than the abusive fidelity that 
Lewis articulates. The abuse principle does not ‘risk sacrificing rigour to facility … 
faithful transmission to playful tinkering with style and connotation’ (1985: 270). I 
don’t know if I can say the same for my Series Translations, or even some of the Live 
Translations. It is true that they may seem close to the naïve abandonment of 
‘grammatical, syntactic, and stylistic considerations,’ in favour of a ‘free-for-all 
approach’ (Bartoloni 2003). However I wanted to push out to the extremes of the 
language of the original, and follow that out to the extremes of English, seeking out the 
‘unthinkable in the unsaid or the unsayable.’ Or, as Heidegger puts it, ‘venturing, like 
the word of the poets, to that limit where the experience of the taking place of language 
in the Voice and in death is complete’ (1971: 286).  
 
Within this context, I felt that if I were to adhere to traditional methods and traditional 
translation theory, I could only fail in my task. This stems in part from doubts as to my 
capacity as a translator, my competence to comprehend and thus to render the original 
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Spanish into English.10 Of course it also speaks of the more serious doubts about 
language, relation and experience that have driven this line of questioning. From this 
anxiety over failure I sought relief. I didn’t, however, seek to relieve myself of all 
responsibility to the original texts. I felt a great sense of duty to them, even though my 
methods may not comply with the economic restraints set out for translation by Derrida. 
The Series Translations at least, seem to fail to adhere to the quantity of the original by 
creating three poems from one original. As to property, the question is more interesting. 
In the Live Translations, there is an immediate, failing and flailing attempt to make the 
original proper, the most ‘appropriating and appropriate’ (Derrida 2001: 179).11  
 
Essentially it is a translation that adheres to the ideas of form and content, but at the 
same time it subjects ‘translation to an aleatory adventure,’ putting ‘languages in 
contest, exposing one language to predation from another’ (Rasula & McCaffery 1998: 
247-248), though not in the disembodied space of the page, but in a visibly and audibly 
dynamic physical environment.  
 
In the Series Translations, although the first two incarnations seem to comply quite 
strictly with the notion of the proper, of proper meaning and appropriateness, the third 
might seem to go too far, to break free from the language of the original and cease to 
merit the title of translation.12 However I found it to be the most appropriate way to 
make the original proper to me, to my way of thinking and writing. To give an example 
that is at once analogous and divergent, Robert Lowell, in the introduction to his 
‘imitations’ of European poetry, claimed that he had tried to ‘write alive English and to 
do what my authors might have done if they were writing their poems now and in 
America’ (1958: xi). While Lowell eschews the title of translation, referring to them as 
imitations, it seems to me he departs from a mistaken idea. It is a bizarre hypothetical 
that uproots the psyche of real, body-dwelling, spatial and historical beings, and replants 
them in what was contemporary ‘America.’ Would those poets, were they to write later 
and in a vastly different geopolitical context, have written those poems? Surely not. So I 
                                                
10 Jerome Rothenberg admits to a similar reluctance to think of himself as a professional translator, since 
his grasp of any language other than English is ‘limited.’ This despite over forty years in the practice 
(2004: xv) 
11 Though due to the nature of the method, there are glaring errors, renderings that in the moment of their 
conception mistook one tense for another, or forgot the meanings of words altogether, replacing them 
with extemporaneous speculations. 
12 Perhaps though, they remain ‘one of those other things in tr., a transaction, transformation, travail, 
travel—and a treasure trove [trouvaille]’ (Derrida 2001: 198) 
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have not attempted to write the poems that Esteban Pujals Gesalí would have written 
were he living and working in Sydney today. Rather I have written some of the poems 
that I might write if I were to employ a similar vocabulary and form to that of the 
original poems. They are not the only poems that I would write because to write a poem 
is to leave other poems unwritten. Each iterative act will always form the ‘broken cast’ 
of ‘a work never penned’ (Agamben 1993: 3). Everything that I write will be shadowed 
by what I was unable to reach, what is determined to remain unsaid. 
 
Again I return to failure and again I look for relief. For a way of translating that, rather 
than attempting to replace the original, looks to set it in relief against its possible 
renderings in another language. The renderings aim to touch the poems at a point. But 
rather than one rendering touching the poem at one point, there are several versions 
touching at varying points. To take Benjamin’s idea of echo and harmony, and Fynsk’s 
extension to the idea of sympathetic vibration, each incarnation aims to strike a note in 
language—having listened for tones in the original—hoping to hear in return some kind 
of resonance, some kind of harmony. The note struck each time is slightly different, and 
hopes to resonate with the mode of intention of the original in a slightly different way. 
Perhaps one is major and one is minor. The third incarnation may have wandered too far 
or not far enough, but I think that, particularly as it sits couched within the context of 
the two earlier variations, some kind of reverberation is created. The Live Translations 
are struck here only once, but in their immediacy, they know that next time they will hit 
a different note, and will never be completely replicable. Hopefully though, at some 
point in these reverberations, the ‘heavy, alien meaning,’ which weighs pure language 
in the originals, is to some extent ‘relieved’ (Benjamin 1968: 80).  
 
Another aim in creating these iterative, indeterminate models is to forge a form of 
translating which fails to side with either departure or arrival; the unity of the original or 
the unity of the translation. In much contemporary study, as Paolo Bartoloni notes, there 
is a trend to trade ‘transparency,’ ‘faithfulness’ and ‘equivalence’—associated with a 
tendency to ‘assimilate the other’—for ‘difference’ and ‘resistance’ (2003). While there 
are obvious gains from such an approach, this manoeuvre fails to break the 
arrival/departure distinction. This represents a longstanding dichotomy described by 
Friedrich Schleiermacher in 1813: ‘either the translator leaves the author in peace as 
much as possible and moves the reader toward him; or he leaves the reader in peace as 
Scott             Writing Through 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  15 
much as possible and moves the writer toward him’ (2004: 49).13 What Bartoloni 
proposes in place of this, is a translation studies that resists the ‘privileging of finite 
products, the original and the printed translation,’ and reflects the nature of translation, 
‘which is intrinsically fluid, under way’ (2003). This theoretical shift, rather than 
occupying itself with the beginning or end points of translation, would investigate ‘the 
area in-between the original and the translation, that zone in which two languages and 
two cultures come together and fuse in a kind of cross fertilisation where their 
distinctive traits are blurred and confused by the process of superimposition’ (2003).  
 
In this ‘interstitial’ or ‘potential’ zone, the original is already no longer itself, and the 
translation is incomplete, has not yet reached its home. The way I have engaged with 
this shift is through my translation methods, which try to relieve the translations of the 
weight of the singular title of translation. Both the Series and the Live Translations fail 
to create definitive, finite literary products.  
 
Of course this failure is once again deliberate, and not just in order to comply with 
Bartoloni’s proposed theoretical shift. These methods also arise from Agamben’s 
critique of the negative foundation of language in Language and Death (1991). In 
language, what we mean, we do not say. From my point of view, all writing, but 
particularly translation—with its fundamental connection to the relation of meaning and 
the evolution of language—has to take into account the ‘negative breath of Geist’ at 
every point in speech, and the ‘unspeakability of Meinung’ in every word (Agamben 
1991: 14). A text is not a mere expression of the thought and emotion of the author, but 
rather attests to the struggling movement in language of its conception. In Benjamin’s 
language: it represents the ‘death mask of its conception’ (1996: 65). The inability to 
merely express oneself is represented by the text. Instead of signaling something 
concrete, it bears witness to a mode of intention toward an impossible signaling. In 
other words: it does not signal or make statements, it merely signs the statement. And if 
this is true, then shouldn’t a translation—and by extension any writing—method bring 
out and make evident the scars of this voyage in language? Both translation methods 
attempt this. One does this through textual experimentation and transformation, the 
                                                
13 As in most older texts on translation, the translator here is distinctively gendered. I can’t help but feel 
somewhat culpable here when many of the texts that have informed this investgation have been 
translations rendered by women. No doubt whole books could be written on the position of women in 
translation, the silencing of an already silenced figure. 
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other through performative improvisation. In another form, I have also tried to approach 
this through my Illustrations. They attempt a kind of writing that is continually thwarted 
in what they intend. They fail continually to put into words what they have in mind, and 
thus in saying something else, they recognise themselves as their own broken moulds or 
death masks. Rather than echos of an original in a translation, they try to become echoes 
of their other, potential selves. The weight of saying what they mean is relieved, but 
hopefully in that process they are afforded a greater kind of significance. Just as the 
original ‘has already relieved the translator and his translation of the effort of 
assembling and expressing what is to be conveyed’ (Benjamin 1968: 79).  
 
The last relieving function of translation (outlined here, at least) involves an effort to in 
some way relieve standardized (standardised? Americanised?) English of its hegemonic 
dominance, and the ensuing tendency to take ‘as universal’ ‘the ‘you’ for whom I claim 
to speak—and hence the ‘I’ who speaks’ (Venuti 2003: 237). This is obviously a much 
greater task than any single project can think of achieving. But any translation into 
English in a small way helps to equalise—or at least helps initiate a movement toward 
the equalising—the inequity of cultural exchange that Venuti recognises (2003: 237). 
As well as this translation contains within it a threat to what Charles Bernstein refers to 
as ‘the legitimizing function served by standardization’ (2001: 224). Though Bernstein 
is not writing about translation here, his questions are relevant: ‘what is the meaning of 
this language practice; what values does it propagate; to what degree does it encourage 
an understanding, a visibility, of its own values or to what degree does it repress the 
awareness?’ (Bernstein 2001: 224). What am I obscuring through my language practice? 
The voices of others? The voicelessness of my own thought? Translation offers a means 
of minoritising standardised English. In Deleuze and Guattari’s dialect, certain literary 
texts can increase the ‘radical heterogeneity’ of language by ‘submitting the major 
language to constant variation, forcing it to become minor, delegitimizing, 
deterritorializing, alienating it’ (cited in Venuti 1998: 10). Translation then, is a 
‘potential site of variation’ (Venuti 1998: 10), questioning the ‘seeming unity of 
standard English’ (11). 
 
So my translations, through a motivation that is theoretical, experiential and political, 
fail to surrender linguistic creations to the standard dialect. If it is true that ‘there is no 
mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political 
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multiplicity’ (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 8), then translation can help to destabilise that 
takeover. This destabilising force has implications for all language practice. In 
Benjamin’s words, content and language form a unity like ‘a fruit and its skin’ (1968: 
76). However, the organic notion of a text is always an illusion. The text was always 
falling apart (though perhaps the fruit and skin image holds, since the skin is always 
loosening itself from the flesh, first in the process of ripening, then of rotting); as de 
Man puts it: translations ‘kill the original, by discovering that the original was already 
dead’ (1986: 84). This does not stand only for translation. There is a kind of pleat 
involved in firstly engaging with difference in language through translation, and then 
folding that back over into my own writing in my proper tongue. It is not enough to 
create translations that signal the ‘otherness’ of the foreign text. Writing in English 
involves a tendency toward the kind of universalism mentioned earlier, and merely 
signalling otherness in translations threatens to leave the standardised language of 
literary texts unshaken. The effect that translation has on our relation to our own 
languages should carry over into other kinds of writing practice.  
 
This is because translation offers, if not the guarantee, then at least the uncertain 
invitation, to radically alter our relation to our own language, to become foreigners, ‘but 
in one’s own tongue, not only when speaking a language other than one’s own’ 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 98). When we engage with translated material and allow 
ourselves to be transformed by it, then we have to admit to there being something 
between us and our language. It involves a separate way of movement (Benjamin’s 
mode of intention), though we cannot come face to face with it. The image that comes 
to mind is of a screen. One of those translucent Japanese screens that are used to divide 
a room. The room we are in is the room of language, and we can make out the 
movement of figures behind the screen. We cannot touch the figure, but we can see, 
ever so hazily, their moving form. The figure behind the screen will seem at turns 
awkward, at turns breathtakingly graceful and economic, and we can only begin to 
imagine how to mimic that movement. This is the task of the translator: to bring that 
movement onto the other side of the screen. Or rather, to bring it closer, if still behind a 
nearer, more translucent screen. 
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The Series Translations 
 
Translation is removal from one language into another through a continuum of transformations 
… not abstract areas of identity and similarity. Walter Benjamin (1996: 70). 
 
 
NUNCA LO SUFICIENTEMENTE 
 
 
NUNCA LO SUFICIENTEMENTE  
levantadas las faldas, nunca  
los pantalones fácilmente  
alejados del lugar del suceso; 
vértigo al nacer en deshacer 
el horizonte indefinidamente 
y un encaje en del mar las enaguas. 
 
 
 
 
NEVER (THE) SUFFICIENTLY 
 
 
NEVER THE SUFFICIENTLY 
lifted the skirts, never 
the pants easily 
distanced from the place of the happening; 
vertigo at to be born in to undo 
the horizon indefinitely 
and a fitting-in of the sea the enwaters. 
 
 
Scott             Writing Through 
 
PORTAL, vol. 7, no. 1, January 2010.  19 
NEVER ENOUGH 
 
 
NEVER SUFFICIENTLY 
lifted, the skirts, never 
easily distanced the pants 
from the scene of the crime; 
vertigo at being born in undoing 
the horizon indefinitely  
and a lace in the sea of the slip. 
 
 
 
 
NEVER ENOUGH 
 
 
NEVER ENOUGH 
this lifting hurts, never 
easily away, entrants 
from a place where 
what happened? undoing  
the vertigo of written births, 
we see the slippage.  
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TEORIA DE LA HIPOTESIS 
 
 
Nadie ha conocido nunca el vacío; 
en ausencia de estímulos, las alas 
silenciosas, interrumpida 
en la parte occipital de la isla 
la sucesión de no se sabe 
qué datos o qué ondas excéntricas,  
suceden sucedáneos, subtítulos  
que crea asustado el pensamiento. Crecen  
acrósticos ingenios que no existen  
porque son de crystal y no son  
ciertos; una cierta elegancia les basta 
que los haga aún más transparentes. 
 
 
 
 
THEORY OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
Nobody has known never the vacancy; 
in absence of stimulus, the wings 
silent, interrupted 
in the occipital part of the island 
the succession of one doesn’t know 
what data or what deep eccentrics, 
substitutes succeed, subtitles 
that create frightened the thought. They grow 
ingenious acrostics that don’t exist 
because they are of crystal and are not  
certain; a certain elegance suffices 
that they are made still more transparent. 
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THEORY OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
Nobody has ever known the emptiness; 
in the absence of stimulus, the wings 
silent, interrupted  
in the occipital part of the island 
the succession of unknown 
data or eccentric waves, 
substitutes follow, subtitles 
that create the frightened thought. Ingenious 
acrostics grow that don’t exist 
because they are made of glass and are not 
certain; a certain elegance is enough 
to make them even more transparent. 
 
 
 
 
BELOW-PAR THESIS THEORY 
 
 
Nobody even knows this vacancy; 
silent wings stimulate the absence 
of interrupted 
cracks to the back of the head 
the success of unknown 
information or uncentred profundity, 
substitutes follow subtitles 
leaving thought afraid. Crossings 
grow that never were 
even the glass of water is not  
certain; though a certain elegancy 
might make the whole transcendent.  
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CUATRO FRAGMENTOS DE UNA POETICA 
 
 
Para empezar:  
Hablar es una arriesgada especie de ejercicio 
y peligrosa… 
    …la hace su imperfección aparente- 
mente más perfecta todavía… 
        Las palabras pueden 
en cualquier momento desarticularse, 
resbalarse de su segunda mano 
que son, sonoridades que se quiebran 
por una grieta, irregularidades 
que el coleccionista valora 
por la conformación 
delicada de sus deformidades. 
......................... 
Diremos del piano que extienden las notas 
autodesafinarse haciendo al tocarlo 
muy difícilmente fascinable hasta el final. 
 
 
 
 
FOUR FRAGMENTS OF A POETICS 
 
 
To begin: 
To talk is a risked species of exercise 
and dangerous… 
       …it makes her imperfection apparent- 
ly more perfect still… 
       The words can 
in any moment disarticulate themselves, 
slip of their second hand 
that they are, sonorities that break themselves  
by a crack, irregularities 
that the collectionist valorises  
for the conformation 
delicate of its deformities. 
......................... 
We will say of the piano that the notes extend 
To define themselves making at to play them 
very difficultly fascinable until the final. 
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FOUR FRAGMENTS OF A POETICS 
 
 
To begin: 
Talking is an endangered kind of exercise 
and dangerous… 
       …made by imperfection apparent 
mind more perfect still… 
     The words can 
at any moment dismantle themselves, 
slip from their second hand 
that they are, sonorities that crack 
and break, irregularities  
that the collector values  
for the delicate  
conformation of its deformities.  
......................... 
Let us say of the piano that the notes extend 
To untune themselves making them at the playing 
very difficultly fascinant until the end. 
 
 
 
 
FOR AND OF A FRAGMENT POETICS  
 
 
To begin:  
To speak brings our species to danger 
endangers us… 
      … made by apparent imperfection 
the mind is more perfect still…  
    Words can 
at some point unjoin themselves, 
they slip down to us second hand 
goods, broken dreams 
irregularities collect value 
in delicate cups 
conforming with deformations. 
......................... 
We’ll say the piano’s note intends 
defined selves, making them play 
very difficult pieces right to the end.  
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The Live Translations 
 
‘The translator, per definition, fails.’ Paul de Man (1986: 80). 
 
On Transcribing the Spoken 
Obviously, in transcribing spoken language, some things are lost and some gained. But 
the overriding feeling is one of loss. For Barthes, it is in the first place an ‘innocence’ 
that is lost. Not because speech is ‘in itself fresh, natural, spontaneous, truthful, 
expressive of a kind of pure interiority,’ but because it is tactical. And in passing to the 
written word, this tactic, ‘perceptible to one who knows how to listen, as others know 
how to read,’ is erased (1974: 3-4). In these transcriptions I have deliberately attempted 
not to clean up the text too much, to leave in some of those ‘scraps of language’ (4), the 
phatic and paralinguistic features of the reading, some of which are inevitably lost in 
any transcription which doesn’t resort to copious explanatory notes. I have decided to 
represent these elements through quite a conventional typographical format. Rather than 
developing a specific typography to represent the spoken form of the translations—as in 
the talk pieces of David Antin, for example—I have chosen to lay out the translations as 
they appear in the original poems, with omissions or additions where they occur in the 
translation. As such, the majority of the transcriptions effect a strange kind of erasure of 
the original, as if by accident.  
 
Thinking of birds, Barthes referes to those desperate, interpellant moments in speech, 
through which a body seeks another body, as songs. ‘Gauche, flat, ridiculous when 
written down’ (5), this song is extinguished in our writing. Reading over the 
transcriptions however, I note at times, in the desperate omissions and catachresis, a 
strange velocity and force in the language. It may not be the song to which Barthes 
refers, but it does seem to contain a musical drive which is particular to the wins and 
losses of the transcription of this specific mode of relation in language. 
 
But writing is not the written; transcription produces a very different textual product to 
the action that we generally call writing. So these transcriptions have a different place 
within the body of the text to the other, more writerly elements. They are incomplete 
documentations of an event. The process leaves things unsaid in ways that straight on-
the-page writing does not. One example is the inevitable loss of homonymic 
ambiguities. When I say the phonetic unit mo(u)rning, the listener can hear—by choice 
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or by chance—either morning or mourning. In the process of transcription however, I 
have to make a choice, as it were. Place one above the other, or one over the other, 
obscuring it. It is also true however that in speaking I may have to efface the 
heteronymic uncertainties latent in the written text. These are just a few reasons why it 
is with a sense of mourning—the beginning of a new day?—that I transcribe these 
utterances. While I may find myself compelled to make these choices for the sake of 
mimesis, I encourage the reader to hear what she or he likes. 
 
These translations were recorded at the University of Technology, Sydney, on 22 
October, 2007, before a small audience of friends and colleagues. Preparation was 
deliberately limited. Though I did investigate vocabulary with which I was unfamiliar or 
had forgotten, I refrained from working out translations prior to the event. This was in 
order to create unrehearsed, unrefined translations. The translations were performed, 
and I wanted them to be performative in the sense that the social—being and 
discourse—is performative, not in the overdetermined fashion of theatre, or of much 
performance poetry. The translation was to be the event of its becoming. 
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CUATRO FRAGMENTOS DE UNA POETICA14 
 
 
Para empezar:  
Hablar es una arriesgada especie de ejercicio 
y peligrosa… 
    …la hace su imperfección aparente- 
mente más perfecta todavía… 
    Las palabras pueden 
en cualquier momento desarticularse, 
resbalarse de su segunda mano 
que son, sonoridades que se quiebran 
por una grieta, irregularidades 
que el coleccionista valora 
por la conformación 
delicada de sus deformidades. 
......................... 
Diremos del piano que extienden las notas 
autodesafinarse haciendo al tocarlo 
muy difícilmente fascinable hasta el final. 
 
 
FOUR FRAGMENTS OF A POETICS 
 
 
To begin: 
To speak is a risky species of exercise 
and dangerous… 
     … it makes its imperfection apparent- 
ly more perfect still… 
    The words can  
in whatever moment unjoin themselves, 
slip from their second hand  
that they are, sonorities that break open 
at a crack, irregularities  
that the collectionist values 
  
   deformities. 
......................... 
We will say of the piano that the notes extend 
to go out of tune, themselves 
    until the end. 
 
                                                
14 This poem was read aloud from the original, and then played back to me via headphones at about 80 
percent of the pace at which it was read. From this listening, I gave a translation. 
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TRES ESTRECHOS15 
 
 
I 
 
Entre el faro de Dover y el faro 
de Calais, diaria y nocturna, 
la conversación el tema evita embarazoso 
de la ficticia existencia de las islas,  
en la orilla equivocada del espacio:  
sobre la cubierta advierten apenas 
los pasajeros qué diplomática cautela 
de sobrenaturalidad 
molesta la travesía alivia. 
 
 
 
 
THREE STRAITS 
 
 
I 
 
Between the lighthouse of Dover and the lighthouse 
of Calais, daily and nocturnally, 
the conversation avoids the topic ebarrassedly  
of the fictitious existence of the islands, 
in the mistaken bank of space: 
    advises 
the passengers which diplomatic caution 
 
  relieves. 
 
                                                
15 This series of three poems used the same playback method, except that the speed was varied. ‘I’ was 
played back at full speed, ‘II’ slightly slower, and ‘III’ slower still.  
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II 
 
 
Sedúcense costa  
e isla y las pasiones  
fraguan en el naufragio. 
Sucédense uno tras  
otro los desatres, 
se trastocan, se embelesa 
prendada la marinería 
de ninfas, de Escila, 
nenúfares, sílice, ¿qué más da? 
Más que vivos, supervivientes: 
agua, un tercero 
que me divide en dios. 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
Coast and island seduce  
each other and the passions  
sink in the shipwreck. 
Things happen one after  
the other the disasters, 
they touch each other, they fascinate each other 
  of sailors 
of nymphs, of Scylla, 
       what does it matter? 
More than the living, supervive-survivors: 
 , a third  
that divides me in theos. 
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III 
 
 
Estira el mar los brazos. 
Como una rosa, la ventana 
se abre al sol. Encuentran un jeroglífico 
los tres de indescifrables 
cicatrices al fondo. 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
The ocean stretches its arms. 
Like a rose, the window 
opens to the sun. They find a hieroglyphic  
of the three indecipherable 
scars in the background. 
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SOBRE UNA MALAGA UTOPICA16 
 
Propongamos para empezar un ataque 
al corazón de la ciudad: 
el muerto—méritos aparte – 
tiene al menos esa utilidad 
principal en la táctica real- 
idad del tacto: abona 
el terreno, organiza 
los órganos y los activa:  
engendra de su podredumbre 
caos, cosas en abundancia. 
Sea ahora su impunidad 
de sueño así en las nubes 
como hasta ayer en la vegetación. 
Sea su urbanidad vigente 
en las selvas crecer al asomarse 
por casualidad y los mares, 
la noche nuevamente 
lo normal y perfectamente 
possible seguramente vivir 
en el aire: divinamente 
 
 
 
 
OVER A UTOPIAN MALAGA 
 
Let us propose to begin a heart 
attack of the city: 
the dead one—merits aside— 
has at least this utility 
principal utility of the tactile real- 
ity of tact:  
 
engenders of its something 
chaos,  
 
the dreams in the clouds 
 
Of its supernaturalism 
 
the night newly  
  normal  perfectly  
surely  
in the air: divinely. 
 
 
                                                
16 This poem was played back at varying speed, over which a friend, Tom Smith, had control. 
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EL MUNDO, COMO LA MENTE17 
 
 
EL MUNDO, COMO LA MENTE, 
es un animal de memoria 
lenta, lentamente loca la noria 
y afecta a sus costumbres, gente 
de bien que no se precipita, 
que guarda el tiempo hasta major momento. 
Como la mente, el mundo cita 
de memoria, invita 
luego, que es final de la historia; 
cubre allí la tangente 
agrimensura, olvida, lo que hubiera 
aquí directamente 
descubierto, escoria 
ya, que danzó arcoiris en la acera. 
Donde calvas las ocasiones, ciento 
por hora labios, dedos en creciente, 
deudas, entre nueve y media y diez 
se anunciaba así al fin y de repente 
el mundo: solo por esta vez. 
 
 
 
THE WORLD, LIKE THE MIND 
 
 
THE WORLD, LIKE THE MIND, 
is an animal of slow  
memory, slowly  
   people 
well mannered people who don’t rush themselves, 
 
Like the mind  
of memory, invites 
later, that is the end of the story; 
the tangent covers there 
surveyance, forgets, 
directly 
scum  
already, that danced rainbow in the pavement. 
bald the occasions, hundred  
an hour lips, digits in growth,  
doubt, debt,  
announced like this the end and suddenly  
   : only this time. 
                                                
17 This poem was also played at varying speed, but was also amplified for the audience to hear, 
simultaneous with the translation. 
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